The Impact of Public Comment
How do public comments influence the outcome of the regulatory process? Using a unique dataset of comments and regulator responses matched via natural language processing, I investigate the success of comments from various sources and using various strategies, including duplicate comments, negativity and coalition building.
Benefit Based Taxation Can be Redistributive with Prof. Matthew Weinzierl.
Contrary to a long-standing concern, we demonstrate that classical benefit-based labor income taxation in the tradition of Smith is consistent with substantial income redistribution through both transfers and negative income tax rates. This result removes an obstacle to the benefit principle's plausibility as the basis of optimal tax policy.
Audits and Fraud Insurance: Optimizing Borrower Defense to Repayment
Should a social planner provide insurance against fraud in a market where private insurance is unlikely and the planner audits potentially fraudulent firms? I investigate this question in the context of the U.S. borrower defense to repayment regulation, which allows students who have been defrauded by their colleges to have their loans discharged in full or in part. In a model of student choices across universities with endogenous fraud rates, I demonstrate that moral hazard induces a tradeoff between the welfare benefits of insurance and the costs of riskier school choices by students. If moral hazard is low, fraud insurance is beneficial for welfare. Using variation in insurance levels across U.S. presidential administrations, I present evidence that moral hazard in this context is minimal.
Big Names, Bigger Barriers: Firm Reputation and its Role as a Barrier to Entry (Hoopes Prize Winner).
I investigate the potential for barriers to entry for new firms and an implicit tuition in worker wages stemming from incumbent reputation. I introduce two models of worker preferences within a framework of matching with externalities and show that when workers make employment decisions based on firm prestige, we expect to see more concentrated markets and barriers to entry for new firms. Stylized facts from a unique dataset on hiring in large law firms present preliminary empirical evidence supporting the model, indicating that workers in a low-entry industry do have a preference for reputation and prestige in their employers.