Training Federalism: Learning from State Experiments in Railroad Regulation
Status: In Progress
Federalism is frequently justified as a mechanism for innovation: policies can be tested in smaller jurisdictions, with the most successful later adopted nationally. Yet we have limited evidence about whether, and under what conditions, the federal government learns from state experiments. To address this question, I examine whether the U.S. federal government adopts state-level policies that are demonstrably more successful. I do so in the context of U.S. railroad law, which features a distinctive preemption regime-narrow but complete federal preemption-that enables clear identification of when federal authority displaces state law in a specific regulatory domain. I show that the success or failure of state laws impacts federal agenda setting, with the federal government seeking to avoid rules that raise prices and to preempt rules that increase accidents.
Benefit-Based Taxation Can Be Redistributive
with Matthew Weinzierl
Status: In Progress
Contrary to a long-standing concern, we demonstrate that classical benefit-based labor income taxation in the tradition of Smith is consistent with substantial income redistribution through both transfers and negative income tax rates. This result removes an obstacle to the benefit principle's plausibility as the basis of optimal tax policy.
Audits and Fraud Insurance: Optimizing Borrower Defense to Repayment
Status: Working Paper
Should a social planner provide insurance against fraud in a market where private insurance is unlikely and the planner audits potentially fraudulent firms? I investigate this question in the context of the U.S. borrower defense to repayment regulation, which allows students who have been defrauded by their colleges to have their loans discharged in full or in part. In a model of student choices across universities with endogenous fraud rates, I demonstrate that moral hazard induces a tradeoff between the welfare benefits of insurance and the costs of riskier school choices by students. If moral hazard is low, fraud insurance is beneficial for welfare. Using variation in insurance levels across U.S. presidential administrations, I present evidence that moral hazard in this context is minimal.
Big Names, Bigger Barriers: Firm Reputation and Its Role as a Barrier to Entry
Status: Undergraduate Thesis; Hoopes Prize Winner
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